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Abstract
Over the last decade, the erosion of trust in public institutions and traditional media
sources have been proceeding in parallel. As recent developments in media consumption
have led to a proliferation of politically charged online misinformation, it is no wonder
that many have been questioning whether the spread of fake news has affected the res-
ults of recent elections, contributing to the growth of populist party platforms. In this
work, we aim to quantify this impact by focusing on the causal effect of the spread of
misinformation over electoral outcomes in the 2018 Italian General elections. We exploit
the presence of Italian and German linguistic groups in the Trento and Bolzano/Bozen
autonomous provinces as an exogenous source of variation, assigning individuals into dis-
tinct filter bubbles each differently exposed to misinformation. To do so, we introduce a
novel index based on text mining techniques to measure populism. Using this approach,
we analyse the social media content of each party and their leaders over the course of
the electoral campaign for the 2013 and 2018 elections. We then collect electoral and
socio-demographic data from the region and, after constructing a proxy for exposition to
misinformation, we measure the change in populist vote across the two groups in-between
the two general elections, using a combination of difference-in-difference and two-stage-
least-squares inference methods. Our results indicate that misinformation had a negligible
and non-significant effect on populist vote in Trentino and South Tyrol during the Italian
2018 general elections.
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1 Introduction
Over the last several years, in parallel with the expansion of online communities outside of
their previously younger demographics, fake news has proliferated online. As recent elections
across the globe have been characterised by a swing towards populism – from the 2016 US
presidential elections to the 2018 Italian parliamentary elections – it is no surprise that the
spread of fake news has been held responsible for affecting electoral results.1 The question
then arises as to whether exposure to fake news actually affects voting behaviour or if it only
reinforces predetermined political beliefs. In this paper, we attempt to provide an answer to
this question by collecting regional data on voting preferences and fake news exposition from
the Italian autonomous provinces of Trentino and Alto Adige/Südtirol, and analysing it in a
quasi-experimental setting.
We intend to follow the path laid out by Allcott and Gentzkow (2017), and study fake
news as intentionally fabricated information characterised by its politically charged content.
Fake news in Italy has enjoyed quite a large exposure in anticipation of the 2018 elections
and, in a recent report from Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 Star Movement (M5S) and Lega Nord (LN or
Lega) voters have been estimated believing (52% and 49%, respectively) and sharing (22%
and 11%) fake news in much higher proportions than individuals who did not vote for a
‘populist’ party.2 As empirical evidence points at increasing internet and social network usage
in Italy growing across all ages and educational cohorts, with middle aged and lower educated
individuals experiencing the greatest increase (Istat-Fub, 2018), it is fair to argue that many
more Italians had access to false information in 2018 than in 2013, when the previous general
elections took place.
Whether the diffusion of fake news has affected electoral outcomes is then a legitimate ques-
tion that deserves to be answered. In this regard, Italy – and the Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol
region, specifically – presents the ideal research setting for the study of the phenomenon. First
of all, the multiparty nature of the Italian political system allows us to analyse electoral out-
comes with much more granularity than in countries with majoritarian systems. Moreover, the
last two elections in 2013 and 2018 have been characterised by strong electoral performance
for political parties whose platform has been often described as ‘populist’: the M5S, which
topped the poll in each of the two general elections it contested, and the more well-established
Lega, whose gradual transformation from a Northern autonomist party to a country-wide
‘national-populist’ outfit was met by unprecedented success in 2018. Also, as discussed in
Campante et al. (2017), part of the growth of these forces can be attributed to a surge in
1See Parkinson, H. J. (2016); Click and elect: how fake news helped Donald Trump win a real election; The
Guardian; available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/14/fake-news-donald-trump-
election-alt-right-social-media-tech-companies; last accessed: 15 February 2019
2Il Sole 24 Ore (2018); Fake news: quando le bugie hanno le gambe lunghe; ilsole24ore.com; Available
at: http://www.infodata.ilsole24ore.com/2018/05/04/fake-news-le-bugie-le-gambe-lunghe/; last accessed: 15
February 2019
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participation of previously excluded voters, fostered in turn by increased access to broadband
internet connections.
Several areas of Italy are home to significant linguistic minorities. In Trentino-Alto Adige/
Südtirol, in particular, both German and Italian-speaking communities are represented in
sizeable numbers. Remarkably, studies show that only a small portion of the local population
is functionally bilingual (Ebner, 2016), which suggests a certain degree of separation between
linguistic communities. We intend to exploit the language differences across the two province
autonome that make up the region (Alto Adige/Südtirol, in English ‘South Tyrol’, is majority-
German, and overwhelmingly so in rural areas, while Trentino is in practice monolingually
Italian) as an exogenous source of variation in exposure to fake news.
Controlling for the electoral trends between the Italian and German-speaking population,
and considering how fake news has been known to spread through channels filtered by an
individual’s ‘echo chambers’ (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017, Boutyline and Willer, 2016), we
then advance the hypothesis that German-speaking citizens have been exposed to fake news
concerning the Italian elections in a lower magnitude when compared to their Italian-speaking
counterparts.
We assume – and this assumption will be tested empirically – that the German-speaking
population in Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol, while comparable to its Italian-speaking counter-
part in terms of economic and demographic conditions, is exposed to a peculiar filter bubble
where exposure to fake news concerning Italian politics is limited. Indeed, in line with the
approach of Allcott and Gentzkow (2017), fake news sources may be assumed to hold economic
or agenda-driven incentives to spread false information. We believe that these incentives are
not met in this case: from such a small population as the German speaking population in
South Tyrol, website accesses may not generate enough advertising revenue, and the impact
on national elections may also be considered negligible as well. In this way, after controlling
for electoral trends specific to each language group, we believe we are able to assess the impact
of fabricated news over electoral outcomes. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
attempt to study this phenomenon using a quasi-experimental methodology.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the literature on misinformation, filter bubbles and electoral outcomes. Section 3 covers back-
ground information on the demographical features and political traditions of the Trentino-Alto
Adige/Südtirol region, along with contextualising the spread of fake news within the 2018
Italian general elections. Section 4 describes our data sources, and Section 5 develops a text
mining methodology for measuring populism. Our econometric model and results are con-
tained in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Section 8 concludes and proposes a simple theoretical
model assisting us in understanding and discussing our results.
3
2 Literature review
Due to the nature of the phenomenon and the growing interest from both academics and policy-
makers, the field of empirical research on online misinformation has witnessed a considerable
growth. Yet a number of challenges linked with developing a successful research design leave
many aspects of this phenomenon unexplored.
Fake news and the ability to correctly recognise their mendacity in correlation with prior
political beliefs have been studied in a seminal paper by Allcott and Gentzkow (2017). Here
the authors also investigate the effects of exposure to fake news – assessing recall rates through
employment of placebo headlines – and the nature of the sources of false information, devel-
oping a database of fake news and a post-election survey in the process.
Other empirical works include Guess et al. (2018), who uncover evidence of heterogeneous
effects conditional on partisan beliefs,3 estimating that one out of four Americans happened to
have been visiting fake news websites in the weeks leading to their interview, and finding out
that fact-checking websites have a limited reach on fake news consumers. Indeed, long before
the rise of a ’fake news epidemics’, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) found evidence that corrections
are rarely successful in rectifying misconceptions among targeted groups. In this context,
the work of Roozenbeek and van der Linden (2018) – where educational instruments that
would allow the public to discern between true and false information are tested in a controlled
experimental setting – is certainly worth mentioning.
In any case, any attempt to study the effects of online misinformation cannot disregard the
work of Sunstein (2002, 2018) and Pariser (2011) on online echo chambers and filter bubbles,
which ultimately highlights how the spread of misinformation is facilitated by online inter-
actions taking place in extremely personalised social media environments. Past experiments
on non-online interactions already showed how peer-effects in homogeneous groups can affect
political beliefs and the perception of reality (see Schkade et al., 2007). More recently, Boutyl-
ine and Willer (2016) find that people sharing conservative or extreme political views tend to
seek reaffirmation in their views associating themselves with similar individuals in their online
interactions, while Del Vicario et al. (2016) show how false information is propagated through
homogeneous online clusters – echo chambers, essentially – each characterised by different
cascading dynamics.
Other efforts, such as Törnberg (2018) and Azzimonti and Fernandes (2018), also attempt
to model the spread of fake news and its effects on political polarization, providing a much
needed theoretical anchoring to the study of misinformation. Finally, a number of studies has
also focused on tracking the patterns of diffusion of misinformation (such as Shin et al., 2018,
and Allcott et al., 2019), and on developing algorithms for detecting fake news (Shu et al.,
3As most of the traffic on fake news websites appears to originate from individuals with extreme conservative
views.
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2017). So far, the permeability of the social network bubbles between language groups living
in the same area has not yet been investigated, and we intend to further explore this topic in
the present work.
While most of the aforementioned research points at an evident connection between fake
news and populism, the assessment of a causal relationship between misinformation and voting
behaviour has proven rather difficult. Due to a number of endogeneity issues, exacerbated by
the difficulties in finding a proper quasi-experimental setting, it is still unclear how much
online misinformation contributed to the rise of populism, and how much populist sentiments
are linked with the inability to recognise false articles. A first step in this direction has been
made in Gunther et al. (2019), who find that, among Obama voters in the 2012 US presidential
elections, those who believed in fake news were more likely to vote for Trump in 2016. These
results are far from definitive: reverse causality may still have led to an overestimation of these
figures since, as reported in Weigel (2016),4 there is a number of confounding factors which
may have led these people to switch voting platform, and which we believe may be correlated
with the ability to recognise false information. The necessity to control for these unobservable
trends and characteristics, along with the bias produced focusing only on the fraction of the
population who voted for Obama, leave the question open for further research.
A number of works relied on quasi-experimental approaches to address empirically political
economy questions. Our research design draws inspiration from this literature and in particu-
lar from the works of Madestam et al. (2013), and of Martin and Yurukoglu (2017). The first
studied the effect of political protests on electoral outcomes in the US, taking advantage of
the random variation of rainfall as an instrumental predictor for participation in Tea Party
rallies. The second estimated the effect of exposition to slanted news on television over voting
behaviour by instrumenting channel positions as a predictor for viewership. In a similar fash-
ion, Durante et al. (2019) studied the effect of entertainment television on electoral outcomes
in Italy, exploiting the staggered introduction of Berlusconi’s commercial TV network in the
country since the 1980s. They found that, while municipalities exposed to entertainment TV
displayed higher support for Berlusconi’s party, in 2013 such support shifted to the populist
Five Stars Movement (M5s), suggesting that exposure to entertainment TV made voters gen-
erally more supportive of populist parties. Our econometric model is also certainly inspired
by diffence-in-difference methodologies, and in this regard the notorious design from Card and
Krueger (1994) has stood as an inspiration.
4Weigel, David (2016); How voters who heavily supported Obama switched over to Trump; The Wash-





3.1 Trentino and South Tyrol: political and sociolinguistic background
In the context of the 2018 Italian general elections, the provincia autonoma of Bolzano/Bozen
(‘South Tyrol’ in the following5) serves as a natural experiment. Once part of the Austrian
Empire and annexed to the Italian unitary state as late as 1919, this Alpine province, home to
a little more than 500,000 inhabitants (527,750, Astat, 2017), is the only part of Italy where
a sizeable majority of the population is not Italian-speaking.
In 2011, 69.7% of South Tyrol’s population declared German as their first language (Astat,
2011). Italian speakers represent slightly less than one quarter of all inhabitants (118,000
people). They are concentrated in the largest municipalities – including the provincial capital,
Bolzano/Bozen, where they make up almost three quarters of the population – and in the
southernmost part of the province. Conversely, in smaller municipalities, a virtual totality of
the population (usually around 95-97%) declares allegiance to the German linguistic group. A
third minority language, Ladin, also has legal status in the province: in particular, it is widely
spoken as a first language in a number of small municipalities in the east.
Like South Tyrol, Trentino was integrated into the Italian unitary state only after the
First World War: before that, it used to constitute the southern third of the Austrian county
of Tirol. Other than shared history, the provinces feature striking similarities. Trentino,
with 540,000 inhabitants (Istat, 2018) is only slightly more populated than South Tyrol; both
provinces are highly rural, with a large share of the population living outside of the few mid-
sized urban centres,6 scattered across hundreds of very small municipalities. Most crucially,
both enjoy a large degree of self-government compared to other Italian local authorities, with
the provincia autonoma having significant legislative, fiscal and budgetary autonomy.7
5Due to its complex history and strong nationalistic currents on either side of the language barrier, place
name choices have long been a matter of contention in this territory. Owing to common usage in English-
language sources, in this study we will adopt the name South Tyrol and the demonym South Tyrolean to
refer to the territory and population of the officially tri-lingual provincia autonoma di Bolzano – Alto Adige
(IT)/Autonome Provinz Bozen – Südtirol (DE)/Provinzia autonoma de Bulsan – Südtirol (Ladin). In Italian-
language sources, ’Alto Adige’, a name with a strong historical association with Italian nationalism, and
the demonym ’altoatesini’ are relatively more common. Together with the provincia autonoma of Trento
(commonly referred to as Trentino), South Tyrol is part of the Trentino–Alto Adige/Südtirol region. In the
following, we will adopt the official, bilingual denomination in full when referring to the region as a whole. For
municipalities and other place names in South Tyrol we will generally use the official denomination (bilingual,
Italian name first, separated by a slash, e.g. in Bolzano/Bozen). For the sake of simplicity, in our primary
data municipalities are listed under their Italian-language name.
6Istat (2015); Principali dimensioni geostatistiche e grado di urbanizzazione del Paese; istat.it; Last accessed:
25/05/2019; Available at: https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/137001
7For an overview of the competencies of the province autonome:
Trentino: Consiglio della provincia autonoma di Trento; "Le competenze legislat-
ive secondo lo statuto"; consiglio.provincia.tn.it; Last accessed: 25/05/2019; Available at:
https://www.consiglio.provincia.tn.it/istituzione/l-autonomia/il-regime-delle-competenze-legislative-e-
amministrative/Pages/il-quadro-delle-competenze-legislative-secondo-lo-statuto.aspx
South Tyrol: Amministrazione Provincia Bolzano; "Competenze e finanziamento dell’autonomia"; pro-
6
The main divergence between the two provinces is, therefore, language: with limited excep-
tions, Trentino is essentially monolingually Italian. This is, to some extent, an intended effect
of the post-Second World War settlement that confirmed the sovereignty of Italy over the area,
fending off separatist tendencies among the German-speaking population. The De Gasperi-
Gruber agreement between Italy and Austria (1946), which enshrined a set of safeguards for
the German community (such as native language education, public sector employment quotas,
reversal of assimilationist practices), and still represents the basis for the current institutional
setup, soon led to the transfer of a few German-majority municipalities from the province
of Trento to that of Bolzano/Bozen. Indeed, subsequent pieces of legislation increased the
degree of autonomy of South Tyrol not just from Rome, but from Trento too: tellingly and
uniquely in Italy, legislative functions are given to the provincial authority (hence, provincia
autonoma) and not to the Trentino–Alto Adige/Südtirol region, which is currently little more
than a coordinating body.
All of this means that the border between the two provinces is akin to a linguistic frontier,
with no meaningful German community to the south of it. Even though there are recognised
and protected minority languages in Trentino – the aforementioned Ladin, plus two archaic
Germanic dialects, Cimbro and Mocheno – their level of diffusion and their legal status is not
comparable to that enjoyed by German (and Ladin) in South Tyrol. Nonetheless, census data
shows that a few municipalities in the north-east of the province have a non-Italian (generally
Ladin) majority (Servizio Statistica provincia TN, 2012).
South Tyrol acts as an unusual filter bubble in the Italian context, clearly showing evidence
of linguistic segregation. Dolomiten, the main German-language newspaper, boasted in 2016 a
circulation of 42,103:8 this is more than four times higher than that of its main, local Italian-
language counterpart, Alto Adige, and exceeds that registered by the most common mainstream
newspapers of the country (‘Corriere della Sera’ and ‘La Repubblica’) over ten times. Alongside
Rai, the national broadcasting operator – which also maintains German-speaking radio and TV
programming – a Province-funded broadcaster relays transmissions from surrounding German
areas. Although both Italian and German are compulsory subjects for members of both
language groups from age six, and graduate-level jobs in public administration require high
proficiency in either language, effective bilingualism is not widespread. Past investigation,
cited in Ebner (2016), points to a relatively low second language proficiency (L2) of the South
Tyrolean population. In particular, less than 10% of 17-18 year old high school pupils of either
language group have reached a proficiency of the other language above the C1 level.
The extent of the language divide is emphasised in the political dynamics of the two
provinces. While devolution certainly plays a part in Trentino’s politics, its voting trends,
vincia.bz.it; Last accessed: 25/05/2019; Available at: http://www.provincia.bz.it/politica-diritto-relazioni-
estere/autonomia/competenze-finanziamento-autonomia.asp
8Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa (ADS) (2016), Dati medi annuali territoriali per testata: diffusione carta-
cea Italia, available at: http://www.adsnotizie.it/_grafici.asp? (Last accessed August 2018)
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especially in national elections, do not dramatically diverge from neighbouring areas. Like in
much of the Italian north-east, Trentino’s dominant force used to be Democrazia Cristiana
(DC), which scored over 50% of the votes in every general election until the 1980s. With DC’s
slow demise, the province has experienced an increase in competition between the centre-left
and the centre-right blocs. In fact, leaving 2018 aside – a year that has seen a decisive win
for the centre-right parties, Lega in particular – the centre-left bloc fared relatively well in
Trentino compared to the rest of Triveneto. This may be attributed to an increased prominence
of localist Catholic-centrist parties, a force to be reckoned with in provincial elections since
the 1990s, which were generally aligned with centre-left parties at the national level (either
running in coalition or backing nationwide lists). Indeed, no localist pro-autonomy party has
ever reached double digits in general elections in Trentino.
In South Tyrol, conversely, the situation is that of a parallel party system segmented across
linguistic divides, to an extent that is not experienced anywhere else in Italy. Since the birth of
the Italian Republic (1946), South Tyrolean politics has been marked by the dominance of the
ethnic German South Tyrolean People’s Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei, ‘SVP’ in the following).
A typical catch-all party, Catholic-based, featuring both conservative and social-democratic
wings, SVP obtained a majority of the votes cast in the Province in every election between
1948 and 2008, scoring landslides (often more than 90% of the vote) in several of the purely
German-speaking municipalities. A remarkable exception is the area of Bolzano/Bozen, where
the SVP has rarely exceeded 25% of the votes. Nevertheless, the SVP can hardly be considered
a populist platform and, in its history, has always linked itself with traditional political forces
such as the DC before 1992 and the Partito Democratico (PD) and its predecessors afterwards.
In general elections, SVP has mostly faced provincial-wide competition from Italian parties
only. In the last decades, however, several regionalist and separatist parties, for long a relevant
force within local and provincial elections, have also ran. In 1996 – an election in which, due
to a quirk of the electoral system then in force, the SVP logo did not appear on the ballot
on its own right – a conservative splinter got almost 20% of the votes. In 2008 and 2013
– elections that were fought with a proportional-based system, Die Freiheitlichen (DF), a
radical-right separatist party akin to Austria’s Freedom Party, received 9.5% and 15% of the
vote, respectively. Consequently, in parallel with the electoral decline of the centre-left in
Trentino, the provincial vote of the SVP has been progressively eroded, now stopping well
short of 50% overall.
In 2018, however, DF did not field candidates in the national election, admittedly because
the electoral law introduced for that year left very slim chances to win seats for German
competitors to the SVP.9 Left as the only German party, the SVP scored more than 60% of the
votes in majority-German constituencies, but only 13.4% in Bolzano/Bozen proper. Turnout
9Alto Adige (2017), I Freiheitlichen, altoadige.it, available at: http://www.altoadige.it/cronaca/bolzano/i-
freiheitlichen-1.1478219
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in German-speaking areas also registered a remarkable drop, from over 80% to slightly more
than 60%.10 It can thus easily be assumed that a rather large share of potential SVP voters
opted to abstain in this occasion.
Figure 1 displays the share of Italian speaking voters for each municipality in the Trentino-
Alto Adige/Südtirol region,11 along with the variation in populist vote between the two elec-
tions.12 While populist vote has been increasing across both linguistic groups, it is evident
that populist platforms have had a greater appeal towards Italian-speaking voters. This trend
seems to persist even in the areas where the two groups are more evenly mixed, and the in-
crease appears particularly marked in Italian-speaking rural municipalities. Of course, there
are confounding factors to control for, and without information on exposition to misinforma-
tion the connection between fake news and populism growth cannot yet be quantified. Still,
these figures prove that linguistic filter bubbles have had differential effects with regard to the
rise of populist platforms.
10Italian Ministry of Interior, Archivio storico delle elezioni, Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali.
Available at: https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/
11Source: authors’ calculations from 2001 and 2011 census data; available at ht-
tps://astat.provincia.bz.it/downloads/mit38_2012.pdf; and http://www.statistica.provincia.tn.it/statistiche/
societa/popolazione/; last accessed: March 9, 2019
12Source: Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Historical Archive of Italian Elections; available at: ht-
tps://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C; last accessed: March 9, 2019
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Figure 1: Language groups shares and growth of populist parties (2013-2018) in Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol.
The size of the circle around each municipality indicates average electorate size between the two periods.
Language groups shares are computed for the period in-between the two elections, estimated through a non-
parametric linear interpolation of Aitchison’s (1986) log-ratios for the 2001 and 2011 census data shares.
Populist scores are computed by multiplying votes for each party for the relative score obtained through the
‘assertive’ dictionary method, summing all resulting scores by municipality, and then dividing for the number
of voters.
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3.2 Fake news in the 2018 Italian general elections
According to several journalistic13 and institutional14 sources, the campaign period leading to
the 2018 Italian general election saw a remarkable spread of ‘fake news’, i.e. entirely baseless
news stories published by non-institutional outlets, on social media.
These claims have been easily substantiated by a recent investigation performed by an
Italian news channel15. Tracking a limited set of politically-charged keywords via a content
analysis tool (footnote: Buzzsumo), it has been found that among the top 100 articles in Italian
for social media engagement, 5 were hoaxes, while another 10 were judged even ‘highly prob-
lematic’ by the authors. While the ‘purely false’ news has a predominantly ‘anti-establishment’
character (and, by extension, anti-PD, the incumbent party), many of the ‘problematic’ (i.e.
misleading) news in the sample focuses on immigration. According to an extensive report
(Giglietto et al., 2018), immigration and security were dominant themes on social media dur-
ing the run-up to the 2018 Italian General election.16
While few in number, the exposure reached by these hoaxes was highly significant. The
second-most shared news in the SkyTg24 database, published on the day before the election
and consisting of an entirely unsubstantiated report of voter fraud in Sicily to the advantage
of PD, received more than 140,000 interactions, mostly on Facebook. As pointed out by some
observers, the news seemed to target a public which was friendly to the 5 Star Movement, and
was widely shared among M5S supporters (including an MP).
In addition, the name of the originating website, the now offline ‘ilfatto.it’, is a potentially
misleading reference to Il Fatto Quotidiano, a daily newspaper very popular among M5S
voters. This ‘spoofing’ tactic of mirroring more reputable news sources was exploited by a
number of partisan outlets, that occasionally managed to create an engagement on social media
comparable to their ‘genuine’ peers. Unsurprisingly, their URL also appeared in ‘blacklists’
compiled by the most popular fact-checking websites in the country (Butac.it, Bufale.net).17
Giglietto et al. (2018) provides a detailed classification of news sources based on par-
tisanship of their news content, evidencing that a vast majority of ‘non-institutional’ web-
13See Buzzfeed News (2017); One Of The Biggest Alternative Media Networks In
Italy Is Spreading Anti-Immigrant News And Misinformation On Facebook; available at:
https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertonardelli/one-of-the-biggest-alternative-media-networks-in-italy-is; last
accessed: 25 May 2019
14See Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (2018)
15Bruno, Nicola (2018); Satira e fake news: gli articoli più condivisi delle Elezioni 2018; Available at:
https://tg24.sky.it/politica/2018/03/08/fake-news-elezioni-2018.html
16This was also influenced by a real, contentious news story involving the alleged murder of an Italian teenager
in Macerata, Central Italy, which was followed by a racially motivated attack against a group of Africans in
the town. See also: The New York Times (2018); This Italian Town Once Welcomed Migrants. Now, It’s
a Symbol for Right-Wing Politics; available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/07/world/europe/italy-
macerata-migrants.html; last accessed: 25 May 2019
17These black lists are available at the following links: https://www.butac.it/the-black-list/ and
https://www.bufale.net/the-black-list-la-lista-nera-del-web/. Last accessed: 29 May 2019.
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sites feature some form of bias towards of the largest Italian populist parties, Lega and
M5S. Crucially, comparable biased sources supporting pro-establishment (and smaller anti-
establishment) parties captured much less social media attention than the pro-M5S and Lega
networks.
The study however stops short of establishing a link between the spread of false inform-
ation in the electorate and the support for Italian populist parties and their policy stances.
Nonetheless, a recent investigation by Avaaz18 provided evidence in support of this link, at
least as far as Facebook is concerned. The report uncovered an extensive network of Facebook
pages and fake accounts (with a reach of millions of interactions) that, in blatant violation
of the platform’s terms of use, pushed misinformation in support of Lega, M5S and other
anti-establishment and fringe causes – including antisemitism and racism.19
As a complement to these findings, we provide further evidence for this anti-establishment
bias by analysing the topics occurring in a sample of fake news propagated between March
2016 and March 2018, the month of the elections. We do so by analysing entry metadata
scraped from an independent Italian debunking website (Butac.it) and retrieving from it the
text of all fake news headlines it reported.20
Using a simple text mining technique on fake news headlines,21 we search for recurring men-
tions of parties and leaders of incumbent/establishment and challenging/anti-establishment
platforms, along with terms denoting topics which have been predominant during the 2018
electoral campaign: namely, immigration, foreign policy and the European Union, and vaccin-
ations.22
Figure 2 plots the relative frequency of these topics over a two-month period, showing
that the challenging platform received much less attention than any other topic. Moreover,
fake news’ mentions to anti-establishment parties and leaders were overall less frequent than
mentions to incumbent ones, providing additional descriptive evidence in support of fake news’
anti-establishment bias.
18La Repubblica (2019); Facebook chiude 23 pagine italiane con 2.4 milioni di follower: dif-
fondevano fake news e parole d’odio; available at: https://www.repubblica.it/tecnologia/social-
network/2019/05/12/news/facebook_chiude_23_pagine_italiane_con_2_4_milioni_di_follwers_diffonde
vano_fake_news_e_parole_d_odio-226098817/; last accessed: 13 May 2019
19As a result, in May 2019 Facebook took down 23 of the pages reported by Avaaz. While some of these pages
explicitly portrayed themselves as unofficial supporters of the two parties, others used a more subtle approach.
The most popular page in this subset, ‘I Valori Della Vita’ (1.5m followers), ostensibly a lifestyle page, was
actually part of a bigger network, sharing in a coordinated manner content from a right-wing, pro-Lega news
site.
20The website was scraped in January 2019.
21We use a dictionary technique which computes a score for each topic based on the occurrence of key terms
related to each topic in the textual database. For this purpose, dictionary techniques require the creation of
list of key words that relate to a specific topic and that the algorithm will search in the text subject to the
analysis, that is the fake news headlines in our case.
22The text bags used to construct these indicators are based on the available fake news headlines. The codes
and data used in Figure 2 (including all text bags) are available in the online data archive.
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Figure 2: bimonthly frequency of pieces of fake news by topic. The dot-dashed and dashed red lines indicate the
date of the 2016 Constitutional Referendum and the 2018 General Elections respectively.
In addition, it should be noted that, when a false fact pertains to the challenger, the topic
does not necessarily indicate the slant of the piece of misinformation: while most headlines
pertaining to the incumbents, the EU, immigration and vaccinations show an obvious anti-
establishment bias, the same cannot be said for the challenging platform. On the contrary,
most of the few pieces of misinformation concerning the Five Star Movement and the Lega
Nord take a favourable and supportive stance with regard to these parties, meaning that the
actually damaging headlines are even sparser than what the figure would suggest. Indeed,
within the time window we analysed, only 6 among all headlines reported by Butac.it could
be said to have an anti-M5S or anti-Lega slant, while 2 of them were directed against the
neo-fascist parties Casapound and Forza Nuova.23 It is also interesting to note that each topic
experienced differential increments in their frequency in proximity to the 2016 Constitutional
Referendum and the 2018 General Elections, suggesting that the propagation of fake news
may be driven by electoral purposes.
While it is not our intention to assess whether the spread of ‘fake news’ was an integral
part of Italian populist parties’ strategy and campaign, in this paper we will assume, on the
grounds of overwhelming empirical evidence, that misinformation and outright hoaxes have
been exploited by partisans of Lega and M5S on social media in the run-up to the 2018 general
23The 4 headlines with an anti-M5S stance are available at these links: https://www.butac.it/di-maio-
emiliano-e-matera/; https://www.butac.it/sindaco-grillino-attacca-zanardi/; https://www.butac.it/sahaja-
yoga-e-la-candidata-del-m5s/; https://www.butac.it/piccole-perle-di-facebbok-i-soldi-del-m5s/. The other 2
headlines concerning the Lega are here available: https://www.butac.it/salvini-i-giovani-padani-e-quelli-del-
mezzogiorno/; https://www.butac.it/democratica-salvini-calabresi/. Last accessed: 29 May 2019
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election, and that this effort was much more successful than that of their pro-establishment
counterparts in terms of social media exposure. The goal of our study is to assess precisely
whether this social media success causally translated to shifts in voting behaviour.
4 Data
Due to the lack of individual-level micro-data on fake news exposure and voting preferences, we
used municipalities, where much more information is available, as the principal unit of analysis
of this study. Our research needs required us to collect information on voting preferences,
exposure to fake news, and important socio-economic features such as linguistic group shares,
income levels and internet coverage. Moreover, information on populist stances for each party
running for election was also necessary. To address these needs, we employed a number of
different sources in the construction of our final dataset.
As in-between the two elections some municipalities were suppressed and new ones were
formed from their merger, a few adjustments had to be made. For all suppressed municipalities
from 2013, values for the corresponding 2018 entities were imputed either by summing the
totals or, in the case of per capita figures, by averaging population-weighted sum of the now-
defunct municipalities.
The present section provides an overview on how these sources were gathered and harmon-
ised. Further information on how misinformation data was collected and processed is available
in Appendix A. All data sources and codes used to construct our final dataset and perform
our analyses are available in the online data archive.
4.1 Electoral data
Official municipality-level data on general election results from the Trento and Bolzano/Bozen
provinces are obtained from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs,24 where the complete
election history of the Italian Republic is available. We extracted information on electoral
results from the 2013 and 2018 general elections.
Other than indicating how many votes each party received in every election, the data set
also includes a number of auxiliary variables disaggregated by municipality. Among these,
electorate size and total number of abstentions or invalid votes were of particular interest for
our research. While voting outcomes have been later used to construct our dependent variable,
these other variables have found important applications in our work. Electorate size, other
than being used for weighting other variables, has proven an important predictor of populist
preference. The same can be said for non-voting behaviour or abstention, which has also been
24Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Historical Archive of Italian Elections; available at: ht-
tps://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C; last accessed: March 9, 2019
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used to control for potential voters of the Die Freiheitlichen party across the German-speaking
subgroup.
4.2 Socio-demographic and internet connectivity data
The proportion of language groups by municipality is a key variable in our identification
strategy. Language group shares for the region can be obtained through census data.25 How-
ever, as census data for Italy is only released once every 10 years, the latest figures available
date back to 2011. To compensate for differing trends in population growth across language
group which may have affected our analysis, we perform a small and simple adjustment by
interpolating the figures from 2001 and 2011 to predict the group-specific shares for the years
2013 and 2018, using Aitchison’s (1986) log-ratio transformation to preserve the compositional
form of the data. While the great majority of locations in Trentino are overwhelmingly Italian-
speaking, language groups shares can vary significantly within South Tyrol: consequently, this
indicator allows us to address the correlations between language groups and exposition to mis-
information with much more precision than a binary discriminant between the two provinces
would allow.
To reconstruct per capita income by municipality, we used tax data from the Italian Min-
istry of Economy and Finances for the years 2012 and 2017.26 Those calculations are based
on self-declared taxable income from the Imposta sul reddito delle persone fisiche (IRPEF),
and per capita figures are already available by municipality. The connection between income
and voting preference is not unambiguous, but has been discussed extensively in Galbraith
and Hale (2008), Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2011), and Hersh and Nall (2015), among others.
Income differences can also arise across language groups, motivating our choice to control for
them in our econometric specification.
Two different sources were used, instead, to construct statistics for broadband internet
connectivity in 2013 and 2018. As mentioned earlier, Campante et al. (2017) found that
increases in internet connectivity have had an effect on voting preferences in Italy, suggesting
that a measure for connection latency should be used as a control in our econometric model or
even as an alternative to our language group instrument. Also, as Italian regions – including the
two province autonome of Trentino and Alto Adige/Südtirol – possess considerable autonomy
in the implementation of broadband infrastructures, this indicator then plays a vital role in
controlling for differences in connectivity arising from staggered local legislation.
‘Digital divide’ in Italy, defined as the share of households not covered by broadband
connection, was originally covered by a set of municipality-specific indicators released by the
25Province-specific census data on language shares is available at: https://astat.provincia.bz.it/downloads
/mit38_2012.pdf; and http://www.statistica.provincia.tn.it/statistiche/societa/popolazione/; last accessed:
March 9, 2019
26Available at: https://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze3/analisi_stat/index.php?tree=2013 and ht-
tps://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze3/analisi_stat/index.php?tree=2018; last accessed: March 31, 2019
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‘Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale’.27 This indicator, which defined any landline connection
whose speed exceeded 2Mbps as broadband, was then subtracted from unity to compute the
share of low latency connections by municipality. As these publications were discontinued, the
collection duty was then moved to the ‘Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni’ (AgCom),
which has released internet connectivity indicators for 2018.28 The new variables released
by AgCom were slightly different from the previous ones, but we managed to reconstruct a
fully comparable digital divide indicator using the available information on the number of
households with a landline connection faster than 2Mbps.
4.3 Social media data
Information on fake news exposition and on the social media campaigns of Italian parties was
all scraped from Facebook. Our fake news exposition indicator shows, for each municipality
and for each year of election, the estimated number of Facebook likes being held by all Face-
book fan pages that are known to spread politically-charged misinformation.29 Due to the
unavailability of granular data on the spread of each piece of false information, we decided to
focus our attention on their ‘disseminators’, measuring – in a given municipality – the effect
of each unitary increase in their social media following on aggregate electoral preferences. Our
estimates will then include both the ‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ margin of fake news exposition,
under the implicit assumption that individuals who ‘liked’ these pages also play an active part
in spreading misinformation. The lengthy data collection and estimation process behind the
construction of this variable is reported in Appendix A.
Our research question also required us to transpose categorical voting decisions into a
continuous scale measuring affinity to populist discourse by municipality. The construction
of such an indicator required access to propaganda content used over the course of the two
electoral campaigns preceding the 2013 and 2018 elections. We turned, again, to Facebook,
from which we scraped all posts from running parties and their leaders, covering all three
months preceding the elections in 2013 and 2018, and coinciding with the beginning and the
end of each electoral campaign. A more detailed description of the data and calculations
leading to the production of our final indicators is provided in the next section.
27Available at: http://old2018.agenziacoesione.gov.it/it/arint/OpenAreeInterne/index.html; last accessed:
March 31, 2019
28Available at: https://maps.agcom.it/#; last accessed: March 31, 2019
29Likes from all pages which appeared in black lists compiled by debunking websites Butac.it and Bufale.net
(as discussed in section 3.2) were estimated. See Appendix A for the full list of pages used in the process.
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Table 1: Summary statistics by province and year
(1) (2)
Bolzano/Bozen Trento
2013 2018 Total 2013 2018 Total
Populist score (total) 5.972 6.526 6.249 4.123 5.899 5.011
(13.376) (15.823) (14.621) (12.074) (15.465) (13.883)
Exposed to fake news 148.424 376.876 262.650 199.858 521.874 360.866
(869.421) (2366.432) (1782.496) (1206.976) (3459.335) (2592.059)
Broadband connections 2469.032 3007.955 2738.494 1987.041 2217.626 2102.334
(7542.113) (7661.528) (7590.388) (6763.404) (7030.532) (6889.395)
Italian speaking voters 879.493 907.630 893.562 2173.312 2226.701 2200.007
(5321.100) (5435.457) (5366.947) (6837.192) (6963.666) (6890.933)
Income per capita 18721.313 20692.652 19706.982 17193.012 18434.036 17813.524
(2534.504) (2728.883) (2807.309) (2188.215) (1891.333) (2134.696)
Electorate size 3245.284 3332.853 3289.069 2276.602 2330.716 2303.659
(7548.803) (7683.594) (7600.120) (6986.644) (7112.244) (7039.726)
Abstentions and invalid votes 677.569 1345.802 1011.685 524.455 649.989 587.222
(1668.889) (2502.587) (2148.627) (1499.638) (1966.976) (1747.624)
Observations 232 352
N otes: Mean coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.
5 A text mining approach to measuring the populist content of
parties
As described in Section 3, descriptive evidence suggested that fake news benefits populist
parties. In order to investigate the electoral impact of fake news, the dependent variable of
our empirical model will hence be represented by the electoral performance of these platforms.
Nevertheless, defining the degree of populism of each party in an objective manner is not a
trivial exercise.
To overcome the issue of objectivity, we apply text analysis to the Facebook posts of
political parties and leaders that ran in the 2013 and 2018 Italian elections. In doing so, we
define populists as those parties that (1) share an anti-elite rhetoric (Albertazzi and McDonnell,
2008; Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Kaltwasser et al., 2017) and that (2) tend
to adopt a particularly emotional language in their campaign (Taggart, 2000; Rooduijn, 2014;
Caiani and Graziani, 2016; Bischof and Senninger, 2018). These two elements are generally
complementary and do not exclude one another. As found by Guiso et al. (2017), in fact, the
supply of populist parties tends to be higher where disappointment with traditional parties is
greater, suggesting a correlation between the rise of populist parties and an emotional narrative
against incumbent politicians perceived as part of the establishment.
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Following these considerations, we introduce a new methodology to measure the degree of
populist rhetoric in each party based on text analysis. In particular, we create two dictionaries
that capture (1) an anti-establishment rhetoric and (2) a more emotional or assertive tone,
and match them with the text produced on Facebook by all the Italian parties that ran in
the 2013 and 2018 elections and their leaders.30 The first dictionary contains 23 words which
capture a populist tone in the Italian political language; for example, the words ‘establishment’
or ‘caste’. The second dictionary is simply capturing the number of exclamation marks as a
proxy of an emotional tone.31 While previous works applied dictionary techniques to measure
populism on party manifestos (Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Pauwels, 2011), this paper is
the first to our knowledge that use them to measure the degree of populism in the political
communication on social media.
We then web-scrape the text of Facebook posts of Italian parties (12.159 posts) and their
political leaders (8.164 posts) that preceded the Italian elections in 2013 and 2018. After
pre-processing the text,32 we first match the words of these dictionaries against all Facebook
posts collected. Secondly, we sum the number of each match at party level and weight them
by the total number of words and the social media interactions per post.33 Given these
transformations, our scores should not be assessed by looking at their absolute values, which
are necessarily low, but rather on the relative distance in the scores between parties. Results
are displayed in Fig. 3 for both the dictionary (panel on the left) and the exclamation marks
(right).
The two indexes display similar trends, further confirming the belief that anti-establishment
discourses and emotional tones are generally correlated in political communication. In partic-
ular, the Lega clearly features as the most populist party in the election of 2018 in both cases,
as a result of a steep increase in populist language from 2013. On the other hand, the 5 Star
Movement (M5s) shows a lower degree of populist language in 2018 than in 2013, for both
cases. In line with our expectations, the incumbent Democratic Party (PD) displays instead
lower levels of populism. The ability of our methodologies to proxy for a populist language is
30We decided to focus on the rhetorical aspect of populism rather than on party-specific policy stances. This
choice was led by the fact that, while on the one hand defining populism as linked to a specific policy stance is
controversial, as it has often been applied to very different contexts (Caiani and Graziani, 2016), on the other
hand, populism can be more easily identified by its forms of communication rather than by specific ideological
stances (de Vreese et al., 2018).
31Previous works in computer science, such as Kumar and Sebastian (2012), found exclamation marks to be
a good proxy for the prediction of emotional statements on social media.
32In order to allow for matching, we tokenise the text, remove Italian stopwords, punctuation (excluding
question marks for the second dictionary), numbers and white spaces and transform all terms in lower case.
We also record the number of social media interactions for each post, a duplicate each text-bag in German
so that scores can be computed for the SVP and DF parties. With the exception of the text bag capturing
assertive tones, which relies on the computation of exclamation marks, we also remove punctuation from the
posts.
33This practice aims to avoid that long posts inflate the populist score. Intuitively, posts containing larger
number of words are more likely to contain a higher number of words that are matched.
18
further reinforced by the proximity of fringe parties, which are generally anti-establishment,
to the Lega and the 5 Stars, such as the far-left Potere al Popolo (PaP) and the neofascist
Casapound (CP).
Figure 3: Text analysis scores of social media posts from parties and their leaders during the 2013 and 2018
elections campaigns. The left figure refers to the scores obtained with the populist text-bag, while the right figure
computes the same score as the frequency of exclamation marks in the text. Parties in grey have only took part
in one of the two elections. The red dashed line refers to the election specific average.
However, such proximity is not constant as, for example, in the first indicator PaP has a
similar score to the PD, suggesting that the potential of the indicators might be weaker for
minor formations. On the other hand, some of these counter-intuitive results might find an
explanation through a deeper study of political dynamics. The clearest example is UDC, a
centrist moderate party, which presented particularly high scores in 2018. This shift might
be explained by a transformation in the communication style of UDC following the change
of coalition in the 2018 election. While in 2013 it ran in coalition with Scelta Civica, a
party founded by the former technocratic prime minister Mario Monti, which in fact scores
relatively low in both indicators, in 2018 UDC joined a centre-right wing coalition formed by
the Lega, Forza Italia (FI) and Brothers of Italy (FdI), which all report high scores in 2018.
By inspecting the words matched under the first methodology, terms like ‘scandal’ or ‘shame’
appear much more frequently in 2018, reflecting this change in communication style during
the two elections.
Despite their relative limitations, these results confirm the widespread categorisation of
parties such as the Lega and the M5S as populist. As a further test, we compared our results
to the values assigned by political experts in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al., 2017)34
to a number of parties for the variable ‘People vs the Elites’, which measures the ‘salience of
34Data are available at the following link: https://www.chesdata.eu/.
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anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric’. Text analysis scores display a positive correlation
with the anti-establishment indicator based on experts’ perceptions, in particular displaying
the Lega and the 5 Star Movement among the most populist parties (see Figures 4 and 5 in
Appendix C).
6 Econometric model
In an ideal experimental setting, voters would be randomly assigned into two groups: in the
‘treatment’ group, individuals would be exposed to fake news, while voters in the ‘control’
group would have access to reputable sources of information only. In this case, differences
in voting behaviour would be explained by the assignment to the experimental unit and the
average treatment effect would be obtained by the simple difference in means across groups.
Such an experiment, however, would be difficult to replicate, as we believe that prior expos-
ition to politically charged misinformation can have lasting effects on voting behaviour that
could affect the outcome of the experiment and bias estimates downward. Indeed, random as-
signment cannot control whether individuals in the control group have already been exposed
to fake news in the past. Preventing access to the control group based on exposition to fake
news would also invalidate the research, as such exposition could be linked to factors that
also influence voting preferences. For this experiment to be unadulterated by environmental
factors influencing our object of study, every element of it – treatment and outcome included
– has to be detached from their connections with real-world politics, something very difficult
to achieve.
This is then one of the few instances when a quasi-experimental setting would be preferable
to an experimental one. The South Tyrol province seems like the perfect candidate for a case-
study, where individuals are randomly assigned at birth in one of two different linguistic
groups. It is not unreasonable to argue that each of these groups is exposed to misinformation
concerning Italian national politics in a different way: as mentioned earlier, and following
from Allcott and Gentzkow (2017), fake news disseminators may have little to no incentive to
produce misinformation across the German-speaking population, whose spread would also be
isolated by the linguistic echo chamber each voter belongs to.
There are, however, a couple of complications that have to be taken care of, the first of
which consists of the different electoral patterns across the two linguistic groups. As the SVP
has consistently proven to be a popular voting choice across the German-speaking population,
our estimates would suffer from extreme upward bias when not controlling for previous elec-
tions. To account for this issue, we would first employ a difference in difference framework,
taking advantage of the different filter bubbles generated across the two linguistic groups in a
mixed language area, constructing the treatment group from the Italian-speaking individuals
in the sample, and the control group from their German-speaking counterparts. We would
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then investigate differences in voting outcomes, exploiting the changes between the 2013 and
2018 elections. In this way, diverging electoral trends can be accounted for. Our diff-in-diff
specification would take the following form:
(6.1) Yit = α+ (Zi×Pt)λ+ Ziδ + Ptζ +X
′
iγ + eit
where i represents each municipality and t ∈ [2013; 2018] stands for each election ranked
by their date. The variable Z proxies for the exposition to fake news for voters in municipality
i. In this specification Z is represented by the share of Italian-speaking population in one
municipality, i.e. by the share of population potentially exposed to fake news due to their
linguistic characteristics. P is a dummy that captures time fixed effects for the two elections,
whereas X is a vector of covariates controlling for demographic and economic characteristics.
As long as assignment to the Italian linguistic group – identified by Z – correctly proxies for
exposure to misinformation, and that exposure to fake news took place only prior to the latest
elections, then the coefficient λ of the interaction term Zi×Pt will indicate the effect of fake
news on populist preferences Y in each municipality.
However, as there are reasons to believe that the two language groups are not entirely
isolated from each other, we reckon that a simple diff-in-diff specification may not suffice:
random assignment to the language group may rather affect the intensity of exposure to fake
news. To account for ‘permeability’ of linguistic filter bubbles, we then turn to a two stage least
squares specification where we make use of language group as an instrumental variable, while
controlling for both time variant and invariant determinants. We then propose an alternative
specification, for t ∈ [2013; 2018]:
(6.2.1) Fi = α1 + (Zi×Pt)λ1 + Ziδ1 + Ptζ1 +X
′
iγ1 + e1it
(6.2.2) (Fi×Pt) = α2 + (Zi×Pt)λ2 + Ziδ2 + Ptζ2 +X
′
iγ2 + e2it
(6.2.3) Yti = α3 + ˆ(Fi×Pt)λ3 + F̂iδ3 + Ptζ3 +X
′
iγ3 + e3it
In the present specification, we apply an alternative definition of exposure to fake news,
based on the number of likes to Facebook pages that diffuse fake news in municipality i at
time t. This exposure to fake news is represented by F in regressions (6.2.1) and (6.2.2), where
its value – and the value of its interaction with the year of election in (6.2.2) – is predicted by
the instrument Z (indicating, again, assignment to the Italian linguistic group) and the other
covariates. The fitted values F̂ and Fi×Pt from first stage regressions (6.2.1) and (6.2.2) are
then plugged into equation (6.2.3) to predict populist preferences Y . These preferences are
computed by multiplying the number of votes each party received in each municipality and
for each election by the party and election-specific populist scores we obtained earlier.
What we develop is essentially a diff-in-diff model where treatment – exposition to fake
news – is predicted by the assignment to the language group. In this way, the relationship
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between linguistic groups and exposure to fake news can be tested in the first stages of our
model (6.2.1) and (6.2.2), rather than naively assuming that the German-speaking population
is completely unexposed to fake news as in our initial diff-in-diff framework, as we believe that
membership to a linguistic community influences the intensity of exposition rather than fully
determining it. If randomisation is achieved through assignment in a linguistic community and
if we are able to control for individual qualities and common trends across the two groups,
then the coefficient λ of the instrumented interaction term between predicted exposition and
year of election will capture the causal effect of fake news exposure on electoral behaviour.
An interesting implication of this new setting is that equation (6.1) will stand as the reduced
form of this model, explaining the direct effect between the instrument and our outcome of
interest.
7 Results
Table 2 shows the results from an initial linear model, using, as for all subsequent specifications,
the natural logarithm of total populist scores by municipality, computed by aggregating text
analysis scores obtained through the ‘Assertive’ dictionary, as the outcome variable. Estimates
from columns (1) to (4) indicate that the positive correlation between exposure to fake news
and populist vote is robust to the addition of various controls.
Column (1) presents our baseline model, including exposure to fake news, year of election
(a dummy coded 1 for 2018, and 0 for 2013), their interaction, and the number of Italian-
speaking voters by municipality. As expected, the greatest increases in populist vote are
explained by the year dummy, coinciding with the rise of populist platforms in 2018. Nonethe-
less, the interaction between year and exposition, indicates a positive and significant effect of
misinformation on voting in 2018.
Column (2) adds the number of landline low-latency connections to the covariate group.
The introduction of the variable in the model increases the model precision from a 37.4% to
a 50.6% r-squared statistic. Still, the exposition effect, given again by the interaction term,
remains stable, and surpasses the coefficients for language group and internet connectivity in
magnitude. The interaction coefficient is again unaffected from the introduction of controls
for income per capita in Column (3).
Further controls for electorate size and abstention behaviour, increasing model fit to 97.9%,
are added in Column (4). The negative link between abstention and populist vote is not
unexpected and indicates that populist platforms may have attracted a number of individuals
disenchanted by traditional politics. Most importantly, the log of the electoral size reveal itself
as the most significant predictors in the model, indicating that the presence of a non-linear
relationship between population density and populist vote. As a result, the effect of exposition
on voting is reduced, but remains statistically significant, indicating that, for each additional
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Table 2: OLS estimates of the effect of misinformation on populist vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
Exposed to fake news -0.0011354*** -0.0012582*** -0.0012231*** -0.0001448***
(0.0001642) (0.0001845) (0.0001742) (0.0000305)
Exposed to fake news × Year of election 0.0007213*** 0.0007971*** 0.0007794*** 0.0001188***
(0.0001111) (0.0001502) (0.0001358) (0.0000200)
Year of election 0.2594730*** 0.1984275*** 0.0584880 0.2994069***
(0.0664220) (0.0584740) (0.0558583) (0.0137647)
Italian speaking voters 0.0002711*** 0.0000789** 0.0001118*** 0.0000234***
(0.0000294) (0.0000354) (0.0000359) (0.0000057)
Broadband connections 0.0001959*** 0.0001526*** 0.0000423***
(0.0000369) (0.0000345) (0.0000073)
Income per capita (natural log) 1.8080438*** -0.0444949
(0.2453946) (0.0602191)
Electorate size (natural log) 0.9826074***
(0.0116515)
Abstentions and invalid votes -0.0001800***
(0.0000289)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Adjusted R-squared 0.374 0.506 0.560 0.979
N otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS estimates for the effect of misinformation on populist
vote (natural log). Populist scores computed using the ‘Assertive’ text bag.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
like to a misinformation disseminator in a given municipality, populist scores increases by
around 0.00011%. While this might seem like a minor effect, it should be noted that the
interaction between exposure to fake news and the 2018 elections is still a significant predictor
of populist vote whose order of magnitude, apart from electorate size and year of election, is
still comparable to the effect of other covariates.
While showing a correlation between populist preference and exposition to misinformation,
the results from our OLS specification may still, however, suffer from bias, as those estimates
give no information on the direction of the causal channel. Indeed, we do not know whether
access to misinformation bubbles is linked to individual characteristics that may already de-
termine a populist preference, either through self-selection or online recruitment. These en-
dogeneity issues cannot be addressed by simple correlations, and motivate our instrumental
variable design.
Results from our two-stage-least-squares model (column 4) are shown in Table 3, including
reduced form (1) and first stage (2 and 3) estimates. Here, the number of italian-speaking
voters by municipality and its interaction with year of election are instrumented to predict
exposition to fake news and its interaction with year. With the exception of the instrument
and the endogenous exposition variable, the specifications in Table 3 retain the same control
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group used in our final OLS model, as in column (4) of Table 2.
Reduced form estimates are displayed in column (1) of Table 3. As discussed earlier, this
specification corresponds to the difference in difference model discussed in equation (1), where
the effect of the exogenous variable on the outcome is given by the interaction term between
language group shares and year of election.
Diff-in-diff estimates indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of the Italian
language group on voting in the 2018 election. Accordingly, after controlling for all observables,
the populist content of the vote in each municipality increased by 0.00001% for each additional
Italian-speaking voter, during the 2018 general elections. These figures indicate a much smaller
coefficient compared to the one of fake news exposition in the final OLS specification (Table
2, column 4). Reduced form figures are proportional to the causal effect of interest, therefore
the positive sign might still indicate the presence of an effect. Nonetheless, unless we assume
that exposition to misinformation is completely proxied by language groups, the coefficient of
the interaction term is not a substitute for the effect of exposition to fake news on voting.
Turning at our instrumental variable estimates, first stage regressions predicting exposition
to fake news and its interaction with year are shown in columns (2) and (3). The positive
effect of the interaction between language group and year of election confirms our assumptions
on differential exposure to fake news based on linguistic grouping. Results from column (3)
indicate that, for each additional Italian-speaking voter, the number of likes to fake news dis-
seminators increased by 0.44. Both models predict exposition with relative precision, boasting,
overall, a 94.1% and a 93.7% adjusted r-squared. Partial r-squared statistics also indicate that,
in both cases, most of the variation unexplained by the control covariates is captured by the
instrument. Most importantly, both instruments pass the F-test for excluded instruments (as
suggested in Bound et al., 1995), increasing our confidence in our estimates.
Our final estimates are presented in column (4), showing that fake news had no statistically
significant effect on contributing to the rise of populist platforms. Indeed, the interaction
coefficient between fake news exposition and year is not only lower than the OLS model
in Table 2, but also not statistically different from zero. These results take any credit for
the success of populist parties in 2018 away from the spread of fake news, and support the
hypothesis that voters self-select into misinformation bubbles and consume fake news because
of their prior preference for populist platforms, and not the other way around.
The untestability of the exclusion restriction in instrumental variable estimation implies
that we cannot ensure that language group affiliation affects voting through channels other
than exposition to fake news and year of election, for which we control through the baseline
diff-in-diff framework. In this context, the estimates in Table 4, where a different instrument
is used, offer a good robustness check of our results.
Table 4 presents an alternative specification where the number of landline broadband con-
nections is instead instrumented. This use of internet penetration is not new in the literature,
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Table 3: 2SLS estimates of the effect of misinformation on populist vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD First Stages 2SLS
VARIABLES Exposition Interaction
Italian speaking voters -0.0000001 0.1260896*** -0.0180990
(0.0000042) (0.0384103) (0.0279361)
Italian speaking voters × Year of election 0.0000155*** 0.2822714*** 0.4468548***
(0.0000043) (0.0538177) (0.0521837)
Year of election 0.2947903*** -299.6037610*** -391.4488535*** 0.3085528***
(0.0138577) (61.4832894) (59.8511025) (0.0137742)
Broadband connections 0.0000434*** 0.0268573 -0.0068932 0.0000435***
(0.0000074) (0.0438686) (0.0328954) (0.0000081)
Electorate size (natural log) 1.0008170*** -329.7326104*** -261.1409531*** 1.0105005***
(0.0097172) (54.2358958) (53.3322464) (0.0133441)
Income per capita (natural log) -0.0633365 517.8909599*** 467.8603218*** -0.0804037
(0.0601505) (153.9726952) (146.1050566) (0.0596232)
Abstentions and invalid votes -0.0001975*** 0.1511572 0.1866705 -0.0002041***
(0.0000310) (0.1454624) (0.1310689) (0.0000356)
Exposed to fake news 0.0000039
(0.0000336)
Exposed to fake news × Year of election 0.0000322
(0.0000218)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Adjusted R-squared 0.979 0.941 0.937 0.978
Partial R-squared 0.729 0.843
F-Test 15.57 69.91
N otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. IV estimates (including reduced form - DiD - and first
stages) for the effect of misinformation on populist vote (natural log). Populist scores computed using the
’Assertive’ text bag. F-tests for excluded instruments for the individual instrument (voters in the Italian-




Table 4: 2SLS estimates of the effect of misinformation on populist vote (alternate instrument)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD First Stages 2SLS
VARIABLES Exposition Interaction
Broadband connections 0.0000465*** 0.1038088** 0.1210049**
(0.0000082) (0.0505354) (0.0568417)
Broadband connections × Year of election 0.0000156*** 0.2938336*** 0.4682898***
(0.0000040) (0.0598440) (0.0665250)
Year of election 0.2921396*** -354.2210447*** -479.8780512*** 0.3890398***
(0.0139390) (78.9100472) (86.3438822) (0.1216419)
Italian speaking voters 0.0000047 0.2079858*** 0.1095598* -0.0002111
(0.0000047) (0.0519421) (0.0594555) (0.0003096)
Electorate size (natural log) 1.0031237*** -281.7179699*** -183.2676752*** 1.2633062***
(0.0094949) (55.3052189) (58.2664905) (0.3251746)
Income per capita (natural log) -0.0683033 425.9142075*** 321.8152469* -0.4203606
(0.0605966) (158.1631244) (164.0089705) (0.5083296)
Abstentions and invalid votes -0.0002307*** -0.5304766** -0.9159087*** -0.0002677
(0.0000347) (0.2504293) (0.2747019) (0.0002180)
Exposed to fake news 0.0015240
(0.0019172)
Exposed to fake news × Year of election -0.0009230
(0.0011707)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Adjusted R-squared 0.979 0.934 0.920 0.798
Partial R-squared 0.648 0.817
F-Test 12.14 24.89
N otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. IV estimates (including reduced form - DiD - and first stages)
for the effect of misinformation on populist vote (natural log). Populist scores computed using the ’Assertive’
text bag. F-tests for excluded instruments for the individual instrument (number of broadband connections)




as it has been instrumented in a number of studies to predict participation in internet-mediated
activities (see, for example, Billari et al., 2018).
Surely, in a cross-sectional setting, the exogeneity of internet connectivity and its efficacy as
a randomiser might be debatable, especially in contexts where rural areas are more difficult to
reach by internet infrastructures. Yet, its connection with fake news exposition is reasonable,
if not obvious, and the staggered investments in connectivity in the region may make a case
for changes in the number of low-latency connections between 2013 and 2018 to still pose as
an exogenous source of variation.
Reduced form estimates in column (1) show impressive similarities between the interaction
term coefficient for the two instruments. The first stages in columns (2) and (3) also confirm
that internet connectivity generates a positive effect on exposure to misinformation. According
to column (3), the following of social media disseminators in 2018 increased by 0.46 likes
for each household connected to a broadband connection. The precision of this alternative
instrument is, however, reduced when compared to the previous one, with partial R-squared
statistics indicating that the broadband instrument and its interaction with time only explains
64.8% and 81.7% of the remaining variation in exposition to misinformation. Yet, our concerns
for instrument weakness are quickly dispelled, as both the instrument and its interaction with
year manage to pass the F-tests for excluded instruments.
Column (4) shows the IV estimates and, while an increase in variability should be noted,
the effect of exposition to fake news in 2018 is again not statistically different from zero.
We then conclude that our year of election controls are good enough for our language group
instrument not to affect our estimates, and that fake news has had no effect on voting outcomes
in Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol over the course of the 2018 elections.
Table 5 shows estimates under a different outcome variable. In this figure, we leave populist
scores aside and estimate the direct effect of misinformation on the electoral outcomes of the
two major anti-establishment party platforms in the region. This model retains the same
specifications from Tables 3 and 4, but focuses on the empirical connections – discussed in
section 3.2 – between misinformation and the platforms of LEGA and M5S, testing whether
these parties have benefited from any electoral gain by the introduction of fake news.
The first stage is identical to the ones reported in Tables 3 and 4, so they have been
omitted, and the table only reports reduced forms and second stages under the two alternative
instruments. Reduced form models, again, produce comparable results, revealing that each
additional Italian-speaking voter increased vote to LEGA and M5S by 0.12 votes, while each
additional access to low-latency connection increased this figure by 0.13.
As in our earlier models, both second stages (columns 2 and 4) display a smaller effect
than what the reduced form coefficients suggest. The sign of this effect is, however, different,
depending on the instrument used: while the broadband penetration instrument still suggests
a non-significant effect on voting, the language group instrument indicates a -0.56 reduction
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Table 5: 2SLS estimates of the effect of misinformation on vote to LEGA and M5S (binary outcome)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Language group IT connectivity
VARIABLES DiD 2SLS DiD 2SLS
Italian speaking voters 0.17663*** 0.20725*** 0.03842
(0.00838) (0.01061) (0.27479)
Italian speaking voters × Year of election 0.11989***
(0.00928)
Broadband connections 0.01619 -0.02315 0.06160***
(0.01265) (0.06440) (0.01656)
Broadband connections × Year of election 0.13135***
(0.00804)
Year of election 73.24935*** 247.33200*** 45.93550*** 233.22003**
(13.78798) (46.84445) (12.43112) (111.98957)
Electorate size (natural log) 61.15233*** 348.66490*** 85.44525*** 302.21239
(12.16195) (86.66988) (11.66156) (293.99039)
Income per capita (natural log) 10.53376 -408.42314*** -29.45080 -341.87453
(37.38124) (118.24482) (36.52034) (445.24376)
Abstentions and invalid votes 0.05411 -0.03984 -0.28461*** -0.07156
(0.04848) (0.18060) (0.05609) (0.21393)
Exposed to fake news 1.31970*** 0.99183
(0.35714) (1.74009)
Exposed to fake news × Year of election -0.56535** -0.34184
(0.25948) (1.07813)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Adjusted R-squared 0.994 0.910 0.995 0.932
N otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. IV estimates for the effect of misinformation on vote to
LEGA and M5S (total votes by municipalities).
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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for each additional like to a disseminator.
These differences are easily explained. As we will discuss later, this negative effect can
be expected, as we will argue that the introduction of misinformation in a system might
generate detrimental effects under specific conditions. However, the results from our internet
connectivity instrument indicate that this might not be the case.
The lack of a continuous indicator oversimplifies the nuanced position of the SVP party
which, as we discussed, still possesses the qualities of a catch-all party while still placing
itself in the pro-establishment camp. There is a populist dimension to the SVP which only a
continuous outcome can capture, meaning that a draconian assignment of the SVP into the
‘non-populist’ field will affect our estimates under the language group instrument when vote
for this party specifically is so clearly correlated with the share of German-speaking voters.
This bias, however, is mitigated through the internet connectivity instrument, which is
unaffected by language group allegiance. This non-significance of the interaction effect confirms
our earlier results on the effect of fake news on voting, suggesting that the anti-establishment
bias of misinformation in social media did not translate into a direct electoral advantage for
these two parties.
Finally, alternative estimates, using the auxiliary populist score based on the ‘Anti- estab-
lishment/ aggressive’ text bag (as exposed in Section 5), are presented in Appendix B. The
three tables replicate the ones presented in this section, with Table 7 showing OLS estimates
and Tables 8 and 9 displaying IV estimates using language group and internet connectivity
instruments, respectively. Our results and interpretations remain mostly unchanged. Table 7
shows that a positive correlation between populist preference and exposition is still present.
Again, these results are overturned with our IV estimates from Tables 8 and 9, showing that ex-
position had a negative yet not significant effect on voting when treatment is assigned through
random variations in language groups and internet connectivity.35
8 Discussions and conclusions
8.1 A simple model for misinformation and policy preferences
In this section we propose a simple model for misinformation and voting that could assist us
in contextualising our results.
Our model draws on the median voter theorem, an approach not dissimilar to the one
followed by Madestam et al. (2013). While simple, it can provide some useful conceptualisa-
tions which could help better understand the relationship between misinformation and voting
preferences.
35First stages are reproduced for clarity purposes but, for obvious reasons, they are identical to the ones
shown in Tables 3 and 4.
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Suppose that two party platforms are contending for election, and that the position of
these platforms can be drawn along a continuous policy axis representing support for the
current establishment. The ‘incumbent’ platform sits on the left side of this axis, holding a
pro-establishment stance, while the ‘challenger’ platforms sits on the opposite direction with
an anti-establishment/populist stance.
Suppose each voter i has a prior preference gi mirroring the same pro/anti establishment
continuum characterising the two platforms. We assume these preferences are normally dis-
tributed with mean g and standard deviation σ.
Suppose also that each voter possesses an intrinsic ability ai to ascertain the veracity of
a given piece of information. This ability can follow any symmetric distribution as long as it
is orthogonal to gi. For clarity purposes, we will assume ai follows a beta distribution with
equal shape parameters, so that A ∼ Beta(α, β) will be approximately normal while still being
supported on the interval [0, 1]. ai will then denote the percentage of fabricated facts which
voter i will misreport as truthful, with ai = 0 designating perfect ability to recognise a fake
fact and ai = 1 indicating that the voter will believe any piece of information he or she is
presented with.
Vicinity determines voting preference. Given the two party platforms setting, there will
be a level of support for policy gpop, after which a voter will prefer to vote for the anti-
establishment platform. Since gi is normally distributed, the median voter ‘bliss’ preference
will correspond to the mean of the population preference, meaning that, if the mean g equals
gpop, then the challenger will win the elections.
Now assume each voter is exposed to the same information stream, and receives a number of
F facts. Each fact j : [1, 2, ..., F ] can either offer support for the anti-establishment movement
(and be coded as fj = 1) or show evidence against it (and be coded as fj = 0). Information
affects final support for the policy conditional on prior beliefs. We model final preference
pi0 as a function of prior beliefs and information held by each individual f(gi,
∑F
j=1 fji). We
make the simple assumption that pi0 is directly proportional to gi, given the share of facts
in support of the anti-establishment, meaning that, if the information stream is the same for
everyone, pi0 = gi(
∑F
j=1 fj)/F . Since ai is bounded to the [0, 1] interval, pi0 cannot be bigger
than gi, meaning that post-information distribution of policy preferences will have smaller
mean and variance of the distribution of gi. In any case, the normal distributional form of
final preferences is unaffected, and the mean estimator will again indicate which platform the
median elector will vote for. No further influx of misinformation will achieve support to the
challenger platform if gpop is already larger than the median value for gi.
Now, suppose that a ‘disseminator’ is able to spread misinformation in support of the
anti-establishment platform. We already discussed the empirical links between populism and
misinformation, and we believe these factual connections can be justified by a number of
factors. Indeed, it is possible for the pro-establishment platform to suffer from severe penal-
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ties from disseminating blatantly false facts in its favour: due to its position as an institutional
force, trust in the institutions might stand as a distinctive signifier of the political identity
and communication of the platform. As a consequence, said platform might be particularly
sensitive to erosion of public trust in traditional media and institutions, rendering a disin-
formation strategy potentially counter-productive. The pro-establishment platform, due to its
incumbent position, may also have better access to traditional media, making the use of new
communication technologies the only sensible choice for the challenger. In this case, the use of
‘alternative facts’ as a source of political legitimacy may devalue the role of traditional media
sources, which instead stand as a vital asset for a pro-establishment platform.
In any case, we assume platforms are faced with a different set of incentives that make
the dissemination of misinformation a less than optimal strategy for the incumbent platform,
meaning that all misinformation will be in support for the challenger. We leave any further
consideration on the nature of these asymmetries to future research, resting, for our intents
and purposes, on the factual evidence supporting the empirical link between anti-establishment
movements and fake news, as discussed in Section 3.2.
The disseminator is presented with a simple problem, to shift the median voter to gpop by
introducing misinformation. The disseminator has no control over who is going to be exposed
to its fake facts, but it can affect the number of anti-establishment facts in the system. The
insertion of these facts will increase the total stock of facts F by K, and will affect the
individual share of perceived supported facts conditional on ai. The formula yielding pi,1, the









Gullible voters – for ai approaching 1 – will take a share ai of the total false facts K as true,
and add it to their stock of perceived anti-establishment facts. Note that the introduction of
fake news might generate a penalty: as the total stock of facts in the denominator is still
increased by K, less gullible voters see their final misinformation-adjusted preference pi,1
reduced when compared to pi,0.
For large quantities of voters, the disseminator can replace ai in equation 8.1 with its
expectation E[ai]. An unbiased estimator for E[ai] would then be given by the mean of ai, as
in equation 8.2. Given that, by design, gi ⊥ ai and the distribution of ai is symmetric, pi,1 will
still be symmetrically distributed, and its mean p1 will still reveal median voter preference p̃1.
An implication of this model is that pi,1 and ai are not orthogonal, so that, this time, support
for the anti-establishment will positively correlate with ability to recognise truthful facts.





The misinformation-adjusted distribution of pi1 will then have mean as in the right side of
equation 8.2 and standard deviation in σ(
∑F
j=1 fj +aK)/(F +K). As g(
∑F
j=1 fj +a)/(F +1)
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will denote the marginal effect of a single piece of misinformation being introduced, the number
of fake facts to be introduced in order to shift the median voter to the anti-establishment








The disseminator will then only need to supply K fake news into the system for the anti-
establishment platform to win the elections. In the context of linguistic groups affecting
exposition, the subscript l : [0, L] could be added, with K1 set to zero36 for voters belonging
to linguistic minorities. In that case, when only pi,1 is observed for at least two time periods,
differences in the causal effect of exposition will be given by the difference between the change
in final preference before (t − 1) and after (t) the introduction of misinformation across the
two linguistic groups, as discussed in section (6): λ = (p1,t,0 − p1,t−1,0)− (p1,t,L − p1,t−1,L).
While factual evidence still suggests that fake news have been overwhelmingly characterised
by anti-establishment bias, our results, however, suggest that the electoral behaviour envisaged
under this mechanism has not taken place during the Italian general elections in Trentino-Alto
Adige/Südtirol.
There are two possible explanations for this outcome. First of all, mean ability might be
too low. Should the distribution of A be skewed towards zero, or bounded by a support [0, < 1],
then lower values for a might lead to pi,1 < pi,0, indicating that increases in support for the
anti-establishment platform will be obtained for negative values of K. While factual evidence
from the Italian elections suggests that K > 0, it could be argued that the anti-establishment
platform possessed incomplete information on a, overestimating the parameter. In these cases,
a negative – or even null – effect of misinformation on final preferences is certainly possible.
The preference-indifferent value for a∗ can be obtained by solving for the first order condition
of the partial derivative of p1 with respect to K in equation (8.2).37 For values of mean ability
lower than a∗, any injection of misinformation will have detrimental effects on final preferences.
Our second explanation rests on a reasoning which transcends the model developed so far.
Drawing on the echo chamber and filter bubble theories from Sunstein (2018) and Pariser
(2011), it could be argued that a different mechanism should be introduced in order to explain
the increased support to populist/anti-establishment platforms.
Our assumptions on information exposition may, indeed, be too unrealistic. There are no
reasons to believe that every individual is exposed to the same stock of true facts as the next
36For simplicity, exposition is here set to zero for the least prevalent language group. Of course, degrees of
exposition above zero are possible and have been accounted for in our regression model.
37Meaning that solving (K + F )2 = −g(−aF +
∑F
j=1
fj) for a will yield the average ability level needed
for fake news to have no effect. Preference-indifferent values for the share of true facts supporting the anti-
establishment, holding ability and the other determinants of preference as fixed, can be similarly computed by





one. It could be argued that each voter is exposed only to a fraction of information N < F ,
and that the share of true facts in support of a given platform is functional to the set of prior
preferences of the voter. If (
∑N
j=1 fji)/N = f(gi), then each voter is effectively exposed to the
information he or she wants to believe, and the two platforms will play an entirely different
game.
While modelling such a mechanism goes well beyond the scope of our study, the implic-
ations of this reasoning are almost obvious. In our model, already, as long as a is smaller
than 1, then the marginal effect of an additional true fact in support of the anti-establishment
will always generate greater electoral gains than an additional fabricated fact. Platforms may
then have no incentive to disseminate misinformation if the stream of true information can
already be tailored to the elector. In this context, fake news would arise because of a demand
for facts supporting partisan views of the world, as an entirely natural process arising from
the increased fragmentation and segregation of political opinion caused by the personalisation
of social medial filter bubbles. In this case, the relationship between populist platform and
the disseminator needs not to be symbiotic, and could as well be parasitic. The disseminator,
while still creating false facts in support of the anti-establishment platform, may be driven
entirely by economic motives – such as obtaining advertising revenue or increasing the value
of his/her domain or fan page – with little to no voting externalities arising from his/her
activities.
8.2 Conclusions
The measurement of the influence of fake news on electoral behaviour has, so far, escaped em-
pirical assessment. With this study, we set to provide an answer to such a question, evaluating
both the presence of this influence and, in that case, its magnitude.
In order to account for the inevitable reverse causality issues between voting preferences and
exposition to misinformation, we proceeded with a quasi-experimental approach. Gathering
municipality-level data on electoral outcomes, demographics and social media usage from
the autonomous provinces of Trentino and South Tyrol, we exploited a natural experiment
occurring in the region to randomise exposition to fake news.
In our contribution to the literature, we believe that our work sheds more light on the
relationship between the spread of fake news and populist echo chambers. Mining the text from
social media posts of parties and their leaders during their electoral campaign, we produced an
indicator for populist content, allowing us to study populism as a phenomenon that eschews
the political dimensions of left and right.
We showed that misinformation had a negligible and non-significant effect on the populist
vote in Trentino and South Tyrol during the Italian 2018 general elections. Our results indicate
that exposure to fake news is entirely dictated by self-selection in misinformation bubbles,
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meaning that the causal channel between voting and fake news goes on a single direction, with
individuals being exposed to misinformation because of their political presences.
In a simple two party model, if all voters were exposed to the same pieces of information,
and if each voter had varying ability in recognising true facts from false ones, then misin-
formation could play a role in shifting median voter preferences. However, when social media
filter bubbles are able to produce personalised information feeds, it is difficult to believe any
given voter is exposed to the same information as the next one. Our results provide empirical
evidence indicating either that the average ability to recognise true from false facts is under-
estimated, or that preferences are not dictated by the absolute proportion of facts perceived
as true. This interpretation would support the hypothesis that the social media information
bubbles can already shift the perceived proportion of supporting facts independently of the
presence of misinformation.
This does not mean that the fake news is less problematic, but only that the causes of the
populist shift in voting have to be found elsewhere, and that misinformation still thrives within
these filter bubbles. The persistence of very similar differences in voting behaviour conditional
on linguistic grouping and broadband penetration indicates that echo chambers most likely
had a role in determining final preferences. In this sense, fake news would rather stand as
the embodiment of shared narrations within groups of voters which are further reinforced by
confirmation bias and the increasing personalisation of social media echo chambers. It may
be possible that, once entered a misinformation bubble, partisan opinions are being reinforced
by the presence of fake news, which might then ensure continued support for partisan beliefs
as reputable sources of information are progressively removed and discredited in favour of
‘alternative facts’. In the presence of personalised filter bubbles, preference dictates facts and
not the other way around; social media plays a role in as much as it provides individuals with
the information they want to believe.
Our final notes address the validity of our results and suggest future pathways for research,
in the hope that our work spurs further empirical and theoretical contributions on the role
misinformation has on voting.
The exploitation of a natural experiment Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol imposes a con-
straint on the external validity of our results, as the relationship between misinformation and
voting might differ in other regional and national contexts. A similar methodology to ours
could be applied to different contexts and with different units of observation, as language
groups and broadband penetration have proven as good predictors for access to fake news.
Survey data might also shed more light on individual preferences and social media behaviours.
Our estimates are also robust to a single definition of populism. Due to the liquid nature
of this phenomenon, it is possible for our figures to change under different conceptions of
populism, such as its more ethno-nationalistic departures. Our methodology could then be
replicated using different text-bags as shown in Appendix B. In this sense, further work is
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certainly needed to address competition between party platforms sharing contiguous filter
bubbles and investigate whether misinformation can affect voting preferences between populist
platforms, favouring certain versions of populism over other ones.
Finally, as argued earlier, we believe that future research should focus on the relationship
between misinformation and echo chambers. As filter bubble access is already determined
by prior preferences and individual characteristics, the attention of researchers and policy
makers should rather focus on the socio-economic determinants for access into misinformation
bubbles. If changes in voting behaviour are unaffected by increases in exposure to fake news,
then, we believe, the personalisation of information streams in social media is ultimately
the most important and socially-poignant factor that should be addressed when studying
misinformation and the rise of populism.
Supplementary material
Datasets and codes used in our estimation can be found in the online data archive, available at
the url address: https://sites.google.com/site/michelecantarella1992/data-archive-by-paper.
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Appendix A: measuring exposition to fake news
The problem of measuring exposition to fake news is far from a trivial one. Other studies
have relied on different methods, such as individual level survey data or the total social media
shares for each piece of misinformation. The structure of our data, however, imposes to obtain
a proxy for exposition that can be broken down at municipality level and that is available
for all units of analysis. There is no way to reconstruct how each fake news has been shared
across social media, and who has been exposed to it. It is, however, possible to construct an
approximate measure of the following each Facebook page which disseminate fake news has in
a given municipality.
This information can only be acquired through a single source: the Facebook Audience
Insight Tools (see www.facebook.com/ads/manager/audiences). This tool, generally intended
for advertising purposes, allows to access information on active Facebook users, who can be
filtered by their place of residence, age, gender, language and many other interests. The
tool yields demographic (broken down by age, gender, relationship status, education, and
employment) and online activity (page likes and social media use) information on all active
individuals in the targeted audience. While it is not possible to filter an audience by their
appreciation for a particular Facebook page, it is possible to target an audience through
‘interests’, and then be presented with a list of pages which correlate with these interests
amongst the selected audience, where the number of audience-specific likes for each of these
pages is also displayed.
We found a number of interest to be correlated with appreciation of fake news dissemin-
ators in Italy. Keyworks such as ‘Immigrazione’, ‘Stato sovrano’, ‘Scienza di confine’, ‘Illu-
minati’, ‘Medicina alternativa’, ‘Casta’, ‘Teoria del complotto’, ‘Notizie Incredibili’, ‘Popolo’,
‘News24’, ‘Sovranità’, ‘La casta’, ‘Massoneria’, and ‘Notizie.it’, all returned information on
many disseminators included in ‘Black lists’ compiled by debunking websites.
While the demographic information of the audience tool is biased towards Facebook users,
we are confident that page likes which is information obtained from these tools presents an
unbiased figure of exposition to misinformation, as it is expected for the the utmost majority
of fake news to travel through social media.
We then used the Facebook Audience Insight Tools to extract a sample of pages likes on
Facebook, using the ‘News24’ interest. We collected this information for each Municipality in
the Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol region, for all users aged 24+, in order to ensure that these
individuals had the opportunity to vote at both 2013 and 2018 elections.
The collection process required a few precautions to be taken. First, as the tool will not
display figure on a location if the number of users in that area is below a certain (unspe-
cified) threshold, we collected all exposition information for pairs of municipalities Trento +
Municipalityi, using Trento (capital of the Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol) as the baseline to
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be subtracted at the end of the collection. This method ensured that: (1) information could
be collected for all locations, and (2) that the tool always returned the same list of pages.
A second issue is generated by the ‘interest’ targeting options, as the tool only returns
information on the number of users belonging to a given ‘interest’ audience who also liked
that page. This means that the number of observed likes through interest targeting will be a
fraction – approaching unity, for certain interests – of the total audience, and that exposition
figures will be under-estimated. To adjust for this issue, we make two further assumptions: (1)
that the total audience of these pages is composed solely of people residing in Italy and (2) that
this fraction is the same for both Trentino Alto Adige/Südtirol and Italy. More formally, we
assume that obslikesIT /totlikesIT = obslikesTA/totlikesTA, meaning that the ratio between
observed likes and total likes is equal across the country. Under this assumption, we divide, for
each page, the total number of likes by the audience figures obtained in the Italian territory,
and we adjust the shares collected in Trentino Alto Adige/Südtirol by this scalar.
Finally, the inability to target specific pages through the audience tool implies that not all
fake news disseminators will be captured by this methodology, as some are – perhaps purposely
– unreachable through interest targeting.
To account for this issue, we develop a simple yet powerful predictive model that we use to
impute the social media following for each of these missing pages, following from the intuition
that the number of individuals liking a page in a given municipality will be proportional to the
total Facebook likes of said page, holding specific effects from each location, such as its size
and the language group, as fixed. If we assume that all page likes follow a similar functional
form, we can then estimate the parameters from this function for observed pages, and then
use the model to impute the following of unobserved pages. In the model:







yi indicates the total number of Facebook likes each observed page has in each municipality,
for i = {1, 2, ...,M×P}, where M indicates the total number of municipalities, and P the
total number of observed pages. Totlikes, instead, indicates the total number of likes each
of these pages has on Facebook, while Municip and Collegio are column vectors of dummies
for municipality and constituency, respectively. The pages used in our estimation are presen-
ted in Table 6, where observed and modelled pages are labelled as ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’
respectively.38
The model allows to predict the number of likes for an observed page in a given location as
a function of the total number of likes of said page, allowing for different slopes and intercepts
38A very similar imputation model was also used to correct figures for the ‘Chedonna.it’ page. As the
exposition figures are rounded by the nearest hundred after a page reaches 1,000 likes in a given location,
figures for this have been adjusted accordingly using the variation in the other observed pages.
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between municipalities.39 With 3504 observations and a multiple R-squared of 0.9237, the
model achieves a satisfying fit and its parameters are extracted and used to impute, for each
municipality, the number of people liking the other pages appearing in ‘black lists’ using the
total number of likes of these pages only. After these values have been imputed, they are
summed with the observed values in each location to obtain an estimate of the total number
of social media likes to fake news disseminators in each municipality.
While it is reasonable to argue that the fake news phenomenon has risen to mainstream
attention only in the eve of the 2017 referendum and 2018 elections, it should be noted that few
of these pages already existed before 2013. To account for this issue, we adopt a ‘conservative’
methodology and, for 2013, exposition to fake news is still computed using pages which existed
in the date of the 2013 elections, keeping the total number of likes for each of these pages
unaffected. While the results shown in Section 7 make use of these adjusted figures, our
estimates are nearly unaffected by the use of a less conservative indicator where exposition to
fake news is set at zero for 2013.
As a final note, it should be remarked that this imputation method is not stochastic, but
deterministic. However, as the final variable will consist in the sum of these estimates, we
are generally uninterested in correctly simulating within-municipality variation, while we feel
that between-municipality variation is a second-order problem considering the good fit of the
model. Also, we remark that the purpose of this imputation is to improve the figures of
exposition so that the effect of each additional like to a disinformation disseminator can be
quantified with more precision. In any case, even in the presence of over or under-estimation
of our exposition figures, the sign, and the statistical presence of an effect of fake news on
voting should remain unchanged, as the imputation mostly scales the total number of likes
in a municipality upwards. Indeed, we constructed another alternative variable for exposition
to misinformation using only information from the pages we managed to observe with the
Facebook Audience Insight Tool, and our final figures are again unaffected by these changes.
Last but not least, our results are only partially reproducible, as the Facebook API suffers
from severe transparency issues that affect the possibility to perfectly replicate this method.
It is well possible, then, that exposition figures may vary slightly when collected in a different
moment in time. Also, some pages may have changed their name or have been unpublished
in the meanwhile, complicating, again, the reproduction of our results. Indeed, many of the
pages reported in Table 6 were closed by Facebook in May 2019 following a flagging campaing
from the non-governmental organisation AVAAZ.40 In any case, the original data set used in
our calculations is made available in the online data archive.
39The coefficient vector γ will produce fixed effects specific to the municipality, while the vector of the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: results under alternative populist score
Table 7: OLS estimates of the effect of misinformation on populist vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
Exposed to fake news -0.0014947*** -0.0015837*** -0.0015547*** -0.0006203***
(0.0002192) (0.0002193) (0.0002170) (0.0001080)
Exposed to fake news × Year of election 0.0009528*** 0.0010078*** 0.0009931*** 0.0004451***
(0.0001458) (0.0001610) (0.0001541) (0.0000683)
Year of election 0.1235975** 0.0793249 -0.0364128 0.2046793***
(0.0613918) (0.0571435) (0.0555898) (0.0298021)
Italian speaking voters 0.0003407*** 0.0002013*** 0.0002285*** 0.0001351***
(0.0000400) (0.0000441) (0.0000453) (0.0000232)
Broadband connections 0.0001420*** 0.0001062*** 0.0000591***
(0.0000318) (0.0000300) (0.0000186)
Income per capita (natural log) 1.4953522*** -0.1794182
(0.2213559) (0.1196278)
Electorate size (natural log) 0.8931439***
(0.0238180)
Abstentions and invalid votes -0.0003172***
(0.0000736)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Adjusted R-squared 0.479 0.545 0.579 0.905
N otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS estimates for the effect of misinformation on populist
vote (natural log). Populist scores computed using the ’Anti-establishment/aggressive’ text bag.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 8: 2SLS estimates of the effect of misinformation on populist vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD First Stages 2SLS
VARIABLES Exposition Interaction
Italian speaking voters 0.0000459*** 0.1260896*** -0.0180990
(0.0000173) (0.0384103) (0.0279361)
Italian speaking voters × Year of election 0.0000268* 0.2822714*** 0.4468548***
(0.0000155) (0.0538177) (0.0521837)
Year of election 0.2148922*** -299.6037610*** -391.4488535*** 0.2562892***
(0.0337123) (61.4832894) (59.8511025) (0.0365017)
Broadband connections 0.0000447* 0.0268573 -0.0068932 0.0000344
(0.0000229) (0.0438686) (0.0328954) (0.0000355)
Electorate size (natural log) 0.9827922*** -329.7326104*** -261.1409531*** 1.0548130***
(0.0213145) (54.2358958) (53.3322464) (0.0406127)
Income per capita (natural log) -0.2918652** 517.8909599*** 467.8603218*** -0.3959852***
(0.1316488) (153.9726952) (146.1050566) (0.1394922)
Abstentions and invalid votes -0.0003442*** 0.1511572 0.1866705 -0.0003668***
(0.0000898) (0.1454624) (0.1310689) (0.0001194)
Exposed to fake news 0.0003419*
(0.0001918)
Exposed to fake news × Year of election -0.0001560
(0.0001440)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Adjusted R-squared 0.8884455 0.9415209 0.9372169 0.8481310
Partial R-squared 0.729 0.843
F-Test 15.57 69.91
N otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. IV estimates (including reduced form - DiD - and first stages)
for the effect of misinformation on populist vote (natural log). Populist scores computed using the ’Anti-
establishment/aggressive’ text bag. F-tests for excluded instruments for the individual instrument (voters
in the Italian-speaking language group) and its interaction with year of election are reported as F-Test
(exposition) and F-Test (interaction), respectively.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 9: 2SLS estimates of the effect of misinformation on populist vote (alternate instrument)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiD First Stages 2SLS
VARIABLES Exposition Interaction
Broadband connections 0.0000632** 0.1038088** 0.1210049**
(0.0000250) (0.0505354) (0.0568417)
Broadband connections × Year of election 0.0000337** 0.2938336*** 0.4682898***
(0.0000154) (0.0598440) (0.0665250)
Year of election 0.2060661*** -354.2210447*** -479.8780512*** 0.3444824*
(0.0344743) (78.9100472) (86.3438822) (0.1834180)
Italian speaking voters 0.0000500*** 0.2079858*** 0.1095598* -0.0002301
(0.0000169) (0.0519421) (0.0594555) (0.0004603)
Electorate size (natural log) 0.9907994*** -281.7179699*** -183.2676752*** 1.3300134***
(0.0203888) (55.3052189) (58.2664905) (0.4918501)
Income per capita (natural log) -0.3014202** 425.9142075*** 321.8152469* -0.7625836
(0.1307629) (158.1631244) (164.0089705) (0.7723294)
Abstentions and invalid votes -0.0004524*** -0.5304766** -0.9159087*** -0.0004730
(0.0001085) (0.2504293) (0.2747019) (0.0003403)
Exposed to fake news 0.0019554
(0.0028663)
Exposed to fake news × Year of election -0.0011550
(0.0017511)
Observations 584 584 584 584
Adjusted R-squared 0.8898863 0.9342932 0.9202511 0.4898130
Partial R-squared 0.648 0.817
F-Test 12.14 24.89
N otes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. IV estimates (including reduced form - DiD - and first stages)
for the effect of misinformation on populist vote (natural log). Populist scores computed using the ’Anti-
establishment/aggressive’ text bag. F-tests for excluded instruments for the individual instrument (number




Appendix C: correlation between text-based populist scores and
CHES data
Figure 4: Text analysis scores of social media posts from parties and their leaders during the 2013 and 2018
elections campaigns (x-axis) and their relationship with the scores on the variable ‘People vs the Elites’ from
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey for year 2014 (y-axis). Higher values on the y-axis correspond to higher salience
of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric on a scale from 0 to 10. Scores are computed using the ‘Anti-
establishment/ aggressive’ text bag.
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Figure 5: Text analysis scores of social media posts from parties and their leaders during the 2013 and 2018
elections campaigns (x-axis) and their relationship with the scores on the variable ‘People vs the Elites’ from
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey for year 2014 (y-axis). Higher values on the y-axis correspond to higher salience
of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric on a scale from 0 to 10. Scores are computed using the ‘Assertive’
text bag.
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